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Regional inequality is generally taken to refer to spatially distributed disparities in spending 
capacity, ability to consume non-public services, access to public services, and ability to 
consume natural resources. Despite being a topical matter in the international literature 
there is a dearth of analysis in an Australian context. We outline a number of metrics that can 
provide us with a sense of how grave the inequality situation in Australia has become. 
Following this we analyse the sources of inequality with a particular emphasis on 
government policy and institutions. This leads us to propose a number of innovative policy 
changes that could address the problem, given sufficient political will. In particular, we call 
for the introduction of equality statements for all major policy and institutional changes, to 
provide a counterweight to the business case methodologies that currently inform most 
political decision-making. 
There is a long history of scholarship on the matter of inequality. Most of the emphasis has 
previously been placed on inequality at the level of nation states, although recently prominent 
scholars have started to pay greater attention to inequality, at the regional level, that falls 
within nation states (Wei, 2015; Sellers et al., 2017; Stiglitz, 2013). One explanation for the 
recent surge in interest, with respect to regional inequality, stems from the perception that 
inequality was exacerbated as a result of government responses to the Global Financial Crisis 
(and there is certainly a good deal of evidence, from abroad, to suggest that this was indeed 
the case for income and wealth equality). Another explanation seems to be that interest has 
increased in response to high-profile evidence of social unrest precipitated in large part as a 
result of inequality (for instance the Occupy Wall Street movement and the Arab Spring; 
Stiglitz, 2013). However, in contrast to increasing levels of attention by scholars abroad, 
there is a veritable dearth of analysis in the context of Australia. This is despite the fact that 
there is some extant evidence of relatively high levels of both income inequality and wealth 
inequality (ABS, 2018 – see below).  
Regional inequality is generally taken to refer to spatially distributed capacities to consume 
public and market goods, natural resources, and spending capacity (Sellers et al., 2017). Most 
of the existing body of literature focusses on economic measures of inequality – particularly 
inequality of incomes, or at a national level, inequality of gross domestic product. These 
measures provide us with some sense of equality of outcomes (although some would assert 
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moments in time), which are largely contingent on equality of opportunity (there is some 
reason to suppose that inequality of outcomes is mostly a symptom of inequality of 
opportunity; Stiglitz, 2013). Indeed, it is probably best to mostly focus on inequality of 
income as an indicator of inequality of opportunity given that it is not entirely clear that the 
former is either possible or desirable (as an end in itself) in a capitalist society. Arguably 
there should be different outcomes to reward effort, risk, and skills – to remove these 
variations in outcomes would be unjust (in a Natural Law sense; Messner, 1952) and would 
probably destroy the incentives that make most modern economies work. Instead, what would 
seem most important is to ensure equality of opportunity (certainly as a justice measure, in a 
Natural Law sense, but also for the efficient operation of the national economy) and this will 
be our primary focus.   
It is important to note that some dimensions of spatial equality exist prior to government, that 
other dimensions are amenable to mitigation through public policy, whilst yet others are the 
result of public policy. Take, for instance, the ability to consume natural resources. Initial 
resource endowments – such as fresh water – are largely given to us as a relatively fixed 
feature of geography; however lack of water can be mitigated by public spending (by 
building dams and other water infrastructure) or can be exacerbated as a consequence of 
restricting access to natural endowments (for example, the Murray-Darling water 
management scheme). In this regard, the term coined by Sellers et al. (2017, p. 9) – ‘regimes 
of place equality’ – is particularly useful as it draws attention to how ‘policies, governance 
strategies and institutions…either contribute to disparities in taxes, spending capacities and 
public services across...regions or mitigate or compensates for those disparities’. At the heart 
of their thesis is the assertion that inequality is not some sort of accident, but is largely the 
result of policies and institutions acting over long periods of time (see also, North, 1991). 
Otherwise stated ‘government sets and enforces the rules of the game…gives away 
resources…and through taxes and social expenditure, modifies the distribution of 
income…[and] alters the dynamics of wealth’ (Stiglitz, 2013, p. 38). Our focus will be on 
explicating how policies and institutions, mediated through political interactions, impact on 
equality in Australia. 
Generally research, both in Australia and abroad, has been focussed on inequality between 
urban regions – particularly with respect to the urban fringe – because this is where most 
people, and notably most scholars, reside (see, Sellers et al. 2017). Moreover, political 
interest has also focussed mainly on the urban fringe ‘as outer electorate suburbs make or 
break governments’ (Beer, 1994, p. 183). However, there is probably greater inequality in 
rural and regional areas in Australia. For instance, where the lead author resides on the North-
Western slopes, most properties do not have access to running water, sewer service, or sealed 
roads. In addition access to basic services such as education, law enforcement, mail services, 
and health requires one to travel considerable distances. (indeed, one could be mistaken for 
thinking that the author lives in a third world country, rather than the electorate of the former 
Deputy Prime Minister), which isn’t the case for even the most deprived urban fringe resident 
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satisfactory). To address this neglect in the literature we have taken a broad view of regional 
equality that specifically considers rural and remote areas.  
This paper seeks to cast light on inequality in Australia and propose innovative and 
efficacious solutions to the problem. In the next section we review some measures of income 
and wealth inequality which, as we note, are good indicators of broader inequality of 
opportunity. Thereafter, we detail some of the reasons why inequality matters. Following this 
we review, in greater detail, the source of inequality. We conclude by detailing some 
efficacious and innovative public policy interventions which might be expected to arrest and 
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Indicators of Inequality  
The most robust and accessible indicators of inequality are those pertaining to income and 
wealth. As noted in the introduction these indicators do not directly relate to equality of 
outcomes, although there is good reason to suspect that equality of opportunity is positively 
and strongly associated with equality of outcomes (Stiglitz, 2013). This is because income 
and wealth are tied closely to political power which is the medium through which many 
institutions, and hence opportunities, are distributed (Acemoglou et al. 2002). 
Table 1 presents the Gini coefficients for twenty-six OECD nations in 2015 (all nations for 
which data was available in 2015 are included). The Gini coefficient is the area between a 
line of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve (which measures the cumulative fraction of the 
indicator being measured after first arraying households from lowest to highest). Essentially, 
the Gini coefficient operates on a scale from 0 (perfect equality) through to 1 (perfect 
inequality). Otherwise stated if X% of households received X% of the income throughout the 
distribution, then the Gini coefficient would be 0 – however, if all the income went to the top 
household then the Gini coefficient would be 1. According to Stiglitz (2013, p. 28) ‘more 
equal societies have Gini coefficients of .3 or below’. By this criteria Australia is not an 
‘equal society’ which probably stands in stark contrast to most people’s perceptions of our 
egalitarian nature. Moreover, when one looks at Table 1 it is clear that Australia generally 
does have a much higher level of inequality than most of the Nordic and former communist 
countries, in particular. There thus seems to be good grounds for asserting the need to 
introduce public policy remedies with respect to the matter of inequality. 
Table 1. Income Inequality OECD Nations, 2015. 
Countries with Low 
Inequality 
 Countries with High 
Inequality 
 
Slovenia 0.25 Portugal 0.34 
Slovak Republic 0.25 Greece 0.34 
Czech Republic 0.26 Spain 0.34 
Finland 0.26 Latvia 0.35 
Belgium 0.27 Israel 0.36 
Norway 0.27 United Kingdom 0.36 
Austria 0.28 Lithuania 0.37 
Sweden 0.28 United States 0.39 
Poland 0.29 Turkey 0.40 
France 0.29 Chile 0.45 
Korea 0.29 Costa Rica 0.48 
Netherlands 0.30 South Africa 0.62 
Estonia 0.33   
Canada 0.32   
AUSTRALIA1 0.337   
Source OECD 20182 
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Income inequality, of course, is not constant over time and in Australia it seems that there is a 
good deal of variation from year to year (see Figure 1). Unfortunately, due to a change in 
methodology income inequality statistics for Australia can only be reliably compared from 
2007-08 onwards (although it can be noted that all of the years for which reliable 
comparative data is presented are above the 0.3 criteria for low inequality). However, it is 
clear that there is no downward trend that might give politicians comfort that inequality is 
reducing over time (indeed there is no statistically significant trend at all). Similarly the 
P80/20 ratio (which measures the ratio of households at the 80th percentile relative to 
households at the 20th percentile – thus eliminating outliers and giving a better picture of 
where most Australian households might sit) also shows a good deal of variation and no clear 
trend (see Figure 2.).  
Figure 1. Income Gini Over Time, Australia 
 








                                                                                                                                                        
2 Consists of earnings, self-employment and capital income and public cash transfers; income taxes and social 
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Figure 2. Income P80/20 Over Time, Australia 
 
Source: Adapted from ABS 2018 
Another way of thinking about inequality is to examine the disparity in nett worth of 
households over time. Here we are able to use a much longer panel of data and it is clear that 
inequality in household wealth is at, what can only be described as, alarming levels (if we 
consider data in terms of the commonly espoused rule of thumb that the most unequal 
societies have Gini coefficients greater than 0.5; see Figure 3). This observation is brought 
into stark relief by the P80/20 household nett worth, which illustrates a difference in worth of 
over 12.3 times between the two specified percentiles. Indeed the P80/20 metric (which has 
the important attribute of stripping out the outliers and thus giving a more reliable picture of 
most people’s relative circumstances), suggests that the change in inequality has only 
occurred in one direction over the period – greater inequality.  
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Figure 4. P80/20 Household Nett Worth Over Time, Australia 
 
Source: Adapted from ABS 2018 
It is also important to see if inequality is distributed evenly across the states and territories of 
Australia. Table 2 presents the Median and Mean wage, P80/20 ratio, Gini coefficient, and 
the proportion of income accrued by the top 1% and 10% of households for income in the 
eight states and territories of Australia. It is important to note that the Gini here excludes 
Government pensions, allowances and other transfers and comparison to the earlier cited Gini 
gives one a sense of how such transfers mitigate some of the income inequality in the nation. 
Table 2 suggests that households in the territories typically have higher incomes, and less 
inequality which stands in contrast to their state peers. This demonstrates that inequality is 
spatially distributed at the level of states and territories in Australia. Moreover, an 
examination of the same data at a ‘capital city and rest’ statistical level suggests that 
inequality is also distributed spatially within states. Table 3 presents data for each greater 
capital city and the rest of the state or territory to provide us with a sense of how income 
inequality manifests within these second tier governments. In each case typical wages are 
significantly higher in the capital cities (where the majority of institutions, political 
electorates and public servants are located), than for the rest of the state; however, inequality 
is mostly higher within ‘rest of state’ areas (especially when measured by the P80/20 ratio). 
This picture of inequality within Tier 2 governments is broadly consistent with the Tieboutian 
concept whereby persons are expected to sort themselves into more or less homogenous 
groups as they seek to match the tastes to the price that they are willing to pay (Grant and 
Drew, 2017). In Appendix A, we further disaggregate inequality data to the next regional 
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Table 2. Income Inequality, Australian States and Territories, 2015 
State/ Territory Median Mean P80/P20 Gini  Top 1% Top 10% 
Australia 46,854 61,036 4.88 0.482 9.4 33.8 
New South Wales 46,879 62,798 4.93 0.494 10.8 35.2 
Victoria 45,930 59,019 4.70 0.476 9.5 33.5 
Queensland 46,052 58,433 4.74 0.470 8.2 32.4 
South Australia 45,445 55,586 4.45 0.452 7.9 31.1 
Western Australia 52,989 70,354 5.11 0.481 8.7 33.5 
Tasmania 43,067 51,517 4.54 0.446 7.3 30.1 
Northern Territory 58,037 67,910 3.87 0.414 6.3 28.6 
Australian Capital 
Territory 61,484 70,807 4.00 0.416 6.5 28.4 
Other Territories 67,780 68,055 5.09 0.394 3.8 23.2 
 
Table 3. Capital City and Other Region Inequality, 2015 
Region Median Mean P80/P20 Gini  Top 1% Top 10% 
Greater Sydney 49,571 67,806 4.81 0.499 11.7 36.5 
Rest of NSW 42,445 52,933 5.19 0.472 7.4 31.4 
Greater Melbourne 47,515 61,785 4.64 0.478 9.9 34.1 
Rest of Vic. 41,382 50,116 4.93 0.461 7.0 30.6 
Greater Brisbane 48,625 61,578 4.53 0.465 8.8 32.7 
Rest of Qld 43,689 55,430 4.92 0.474 7.4 32.0 
Greater Adelaide 46,581 57,028 4.32 0.449 8.2 31.2 
Rest of SA 41,378 50,390 5.00 0.464 6.5 30.6 
Greater Perth 53,640 71,472 5.01 0.482 9.1 34.0 
Rest of WA 50,264 65,748 5.55 0.475 6.4 31.0 
Greater Hobart 45,427 54,569 4.29 0.440 7.7 30.3 
Rest of Tas. 41,208 49,015 4.74 0.450 6.9 29.9 
Greater Darwin 60,572 71,185 3.74 0.412 6.5 28.9 
Rest of NT 51,797 59,232 4.21 0.411 5.4 26.9 
Australian Capital 
Territory 61,482 70,804 4.00 0.416 6.5 28.4 
Other Territories 69,841 69,307 5.08 0.390 3.7 23.0 
Source: ABS (2018) 
In sum, relative to other nations Australia has modest levels of income inequality that would 
probably be a good deal worse except for the provision of government transfers. Incomes are 
typically higher in the ACT and capital cities, which are also the location for the bulk of 
Australia’s institutions, political electorates, and public servants. As one moves out to the 
fringe incomes typically decrease, as does inequality (within the region) – suggesting that 
there is a degree of sorting involved in household location decisions. Rural areas typically 
have low incomes but mid-range levels of inequality that may be a consequence of rural 
estate legacies. In terms of wealth inequality, Australia has a disturbingly high Gini 
coefficient. Moreover the P80/20 ratio for nett household wealth shows that the trend has 
been ever upwards and that the difference between the two percentiles is a factor of over 
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(such as access to public goods, market goods and ability to consume natural endowments). 
However, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the spatial distribution of these dimensions 
will follow the spatial distribution of income and wealth because opportunity is associated 
with spending capacity and political power (Acemglou et al. 2002; Pike et al. 2007; Stiglitz, 
2013) whilst economic theory predicts that house valuations (a large part of Australian’s 
wealth) have imputed to them the standard and access of public services and some natural 
endowments (Ladd, 1998; Grant and Drew, 2017). Moreover, one should be mindful that 
access to many public goods and market goods on the urban fringe is within tolerable 
commuting range (and often accessible through public transport). Thus prima facie disparities 
between urban fringe and rural incomes, whilst being a reliable indicator of spending 
capacity, may fail to adequately convey disparities with respect to access to public goods (in 
particular) and market goods for these two groups. 
We now examine, in greater detail why inequality matters in order to better explain the 
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Why does Inequality Matter? 
There are strong economic justifications for preferring greater regional equality given that it 
reduces inefficient migration of capital and labour (Oates, 1999) and migration of labour, in 
particular, has implications for the cost of providing infrastructure (Beer, 1994), and other 
costs associated with housing supply and affordability. In addition, regional equality is also 
critical to the health of federations given that it is associated with reductions to wasteful 
lobbying and less opportunities for pork barrelling (Drew and Campbell, 2016), binds the 
federation together (Boadway and Shah, 2009) and reduces political conflict (Lecours and 
Beland, 2013). However, as laudable as these economic and federation rationales are for 
regional equality, they fail to provide a persuasive moral justification for reducing regional 
inequality. It is only when we consider both the desirability of achieving equality of 
opportunity (which does have a ready moral justification in Natural Law3) and the fact that 
the infrastructure, natural resources and institutions required for same are spatially 
distributed, that it becomes clear that a certain degree of equality at the regional level is 
indirectly required for a just society. Otherwise stated, unless regions have largely similar 
levels of equality in terms of infrastructure, access to institutions, and ability to consume 
natural resources, then it is hard to see how any two similar persons living in two distinct 
regions might be able to have similar equality of opportunity (notably equality of opportunity 
will still depend on other factors (which we detail below), what we are simply asserting here 
is that regional equality seems to be a pre-requisite for equality of opportunity – see Drew 
and Dollery, 2015).  
There are a number of other grounds for preferring lower levels of inequality between 
households, in a nation. For example, there is evidence that domestic market consumption is 
stronger where less inequality occurs, as are growth in small business (both of which arise 
from clearer definition of more homogenous markets) and economic growth more generally 
(although causality is an altogether more difficult matter to demonstrate; Biswas et al. 2017). 
Moreover, because a lot of inequality is caused by rent-seeking (an unproductive activity in 
which persons or businesses seek to receive surpluses that are greater than what might be 
received in a competitive market) and political capitalisation (turning hard capital into votes; 
Weingast et al. 1981; Drew and Dollery, 2017), inequality is economically inefficient (it also 
represents a sub-optimal use of human and natural resources). Indeed, it has been 
persuasively argued that inequality puts ‘democracy in peril’ (Stiglitz, 2013, p. 148) because 
if people perceive that inequality is being exacerbated by unequal voice and power then they 
will participate less in the political process, trust less in political leadership (and institutions 
and the media who report on same) and be more inclined to participate in civil disobedience 
(Stiglitz, 2013). The fact that only around 90 % of those who bother to register to vote 
actually turned out for the 2016 Federal election for nominally compulsory voting, and that a 
further 5% of those cast an informal vote, should alert the political class to the likelihood that 
                                                 
3 Specifically Natural Law provides a moral case for dignity (the inherent right of persons to pursue their 
existential ends), whilst fostering the common good (the help accruing to persons through co-operation) (Drew 
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many Australian’s are feeling (and becoming) politically disenfranchised4 (see, Tables 4 and 
5).  
Table 4. Measures of Voter Disillusionment 2016 Federal Election - Turnout 
State/Territory Enrolment Turnout 
Percentage 
Turnout 
New South Wales 5084274 4651399 91.49 
Victoria 3963992 3612823 91.14 
Queensland 3074422 2802951 91.17 
Western Australia 1577215 1394006 88.38 
South Australia 1183004 1086171 91.81 
Tasmania 373470 349549 93.59 
Australian Capital Territory 282045 259927 92.16 
Northern Territory 133129 105190 79.01 
 
Table 5. Measures of Voter Disillusionment 2016 Federal Election – Informal Votes 





New South Wales 4364320 287079 4651399 6.17 
Victoria 3440654 172169 3612823 4.77 
Queensland 2671229 131722 2802951 4.7 
Western Australia 1338337 55669 1394006 3.99 
South Australia 1040736 45435 1086171 4.18 
Tasmania 335623 13926 349549 3.98 
Australian Capital Territory 252742 7185 259927 2.76 
Northern Territory 97460 7730 105190 7.35 
 
The effect of inequality on democracy is a vicious cycle – the more people feel un-
empowered the less they will trust and participate and hence the less they will be heard in the 
future. A similar vicious cycle occurs with respect to equality of opportunity and equality of 
outcomes. The less opportunity there is for moving up the inequality ladder, the less 
likelihood there is that persons in a position of power will fully appreciate the level of 
inequality that exists and hence the less likely it is that inequality will be addressed. This 
cycle probably explains the inequality of outcomes data that we briefly surveyed earlier, as 
well as the importance of addressing inequality of opportunity as soon as possible. 
  
                                                 
4 Another indication of political disenfranchisement is to make a survey of politicians from low socio-economic 
backgrounds, politicians from the ranks of the voting-aged youth, politicians from various minority groups, and 
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Sources of Inequality 
Inequality is principally the result of ‘long-term trajectories of policies and institutional 
development’ (Sellers et al., 2017, p. 271; see also, Acemoglou et al. 2002; Pike et al. 2007; 
Beer, 1994) and policies and institutions are arbitrated largely through the political process. 
Therefore if there is inequality at a regional level we can probably trace much of its source 
back to political inequality (Stiglitz, 2013; Acemoglou and Robinson, 2000).  
There are three main sources of inequality in political power in the Australian federation. 
First, because electoral boundaries are associated with population, and because population is 
concentrated in greater capital cities, it follows that there are more political representatives 
from greater capital cities in the two tiers of Australian parliaments, then there are from, for 
instance, rural and remote areas (Parliament of Australia, 2018). Second, due to the 
combination of geographically defined electoral boundaries and preferential voting systems 
the proportion of the votes that a party attracts (which can be considered a reflection of 
political preferences) is not reflected in the number of seats that the party receives in the 
lower house. For instance, in the 2016 Federal election the Greens (nationally) received 
around 10% of the vote, but received just 0.7% of the lower house seats; conversely the 
Liberal party attracted approximately 29% of the vote and initially received almost 39% of 
the seats (Australian Electoral Commission, 2016). When these two sources of inequality in 
political power are considered together it suggests that the political preferences of the voters 
who constitute regions are not being reflected in the make-up of the lower houses of 
Parliaments5. Third, all Australians do not have equal access to Ministers. Constituents who 
live in the electorate of a Minister have greater access than those who do not; and a number 
of recent high profile cases have shown us that political donors and lobbyists have greater 
access to Ministers than regular constituents. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that 
foreign powers have greater access to Ministers and shadow-Ministers than the regular 
Australian constituent (ABC, 2017)! The point is that it may be one vote one value in 
rhetoric, but it is impossible to argue that it is one vote one value in actual fact – specifically, 
it is those at the top of the inequality ladder, who are likely to being wielding the greatest 
power in Australia’s political system, just as it is the top 1% that have the political power 
abroad (Stiglitz, 2013). 
Most of the spatial manifestations of inequality – access to natural resources, access to 
infrastructure and institutions, access to non-public goods and services – have their origins, or 
could be mitigated, through the political process. We now consider each one in turn in order 
to provide a level of explication that is conducive to outlining specific and efficacious public 
policy remedies in our concluding section (which follows). 
As noted earlier, inequality can be seen in inequitable access to natural endowments (such as 
water, minerals, clean air; see Sellers et al. 2017; Acemoglou et al. 2002). Not only are 
natural resources spatially distributed, but the problem of unequal access is further 
compounded by policies that regulate the consumption of resources (for example, water 
                                                 
5 This is not the case for the Upper House so much (although federally it is constrained by state/territory 
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controls, logging controls, bans on coal seam gas (CSG) extractions). The irony of the 
situation in Australia is that the political interests regulating the consumption of natural 
resources generally hail from regions far removed from where the effects of the constraint 
will bite. For instance, only one of the Green’s federal parliamentarians – who have a range 
of party policies constraining use of natural resources – lists their political office outside of 
Canberra or a Greater Capital City (Greens, 2018).  
Another aspect of inequality is unequal access to public goods and services. For example, 
infrastructure often varies by region and, as we have noted earlier, properties outside of towns 
in rural and remote areas generally do not have access to hard infrastructure such as town 
water, sewer services, and sealed roads. Also it is often the case that reliable grid electricity, 
and telecommunications are not available to rural and remote residents. Notably, all urban 
areas have access to this sort of infrastructure, including regions on the urban fringe which 
have previously captured most of the attention by those concerned about regional equality. 
Similarly, institutions are distributed spatially. Access to police, schools (particularly high 
schools), tertiary campuses, Courts (particularly higher courts), hospitals, government aged 
care facilities and a host of other critical institutions are either not available within reasonable 
commuting distance (for rural and remote regions), or are available at a standard that is less 
than desirable (particularly for some urban fringe regions). This has obvious implications for 
consumption of many important public goods and services (Sellers et al. 2017), but also has 
oft overlooked implications for regional economies (Grant and Drew, 2017). We have already 
noted disparities in typical incomes which coincide with capital cities in each state and 
territory and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). It is probably no coincidence that the 
bulk of the state and territory public servants are located in these capital cities, and the largest 
portion of federal public servants are located in the ACT (see Table 7). Public servants attract 
good wages and security in employment that may not exist for many other sectors and 
decisions about where public servants are located therefore have significant impacts on local 
economies (for example, Table 7 provides details of a $7.3b contribution to the ACT 
economy through Federal public servant location choice). Moreover, because the funds to pay 
public servants are also derived from areas outside of the capital cities it essentially results in 
the export of capital from some rural and remote regions (especially where mining royalties 
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New South Wales 
2016
-17            53.4           469.1  
 
      4,582.8      35,913.9  
Victoria 
2016
-17            46.3           358.3  
 
      3,948.9      26,569.6  
Queensland 
2016
-17            28.6           322.3  
 
      2,284.0      25,526.5  
South Australia 
2016
-17            14.8           115.8  
 
      1,284.5        9,014.0  
Western Australia 
2016
-17            12.3           171.9  
 
         948.4      14,404.3  
Tasmania 
2016
-17              5.2  n/a 
 
         406.4  n/a 
Northern Territory 
2016
-17              4.1             27.1  
 




-17            75.0  n/a 
 
      7,299.1  n/a 
Australia 
2016
-17          239.8        1,527.6  
 
    21,073.4    119,000.6  
Source: ABS, 2017. 
Access to markets is also spatially distributed, and hence opportunities to consume non-
public goods. Specifically, a form of market failure associated with the size and density of 
population, means that it is often not economically viable to have a physical presence in 
many rural and remote communities. Lack of a physical presence can sometimes be mitigated 
through technology (if residents have access to reliable telecommunications), although there 
is a price to pay (in choice and consumer satisfaction, but also importantly in the cost to have 
the good posted – and the cost required to pick up the goods (many rural communities do not 
receive postal services and have to travel to the nearest Post Office, which can be a 
considerable distance away, to pick up the goods despite the fact that they pay at least the 
same rate of freight as do residents in urban areas who receive delivery to their door6)). 
However, sometimes there can be no mitigation for market failure – where a physical 
presence is an absolute imperative (such as for Post Offices, and Banks (particularly for 
businesses that need to deposit or withdraw cash to facilitate transactions)) – and residents are 
either left to travel hundreds of kilometres to consume essential services, or governments 
(generally local government) are forced to step in and operate (and hence bear the cost) of an 
economically inefficient business (see, for example, Drew and Campbell, 2016).  
One way that government redistributes income and wealth is through the taxation system and 
it is therefore important to briefly depart from our consideration of manifestations of spatial 
inequalities to also reflect on how taxation can mitigate or exacerbate regional inequality. A 
few examples will help explicate this point. For instance, take the Goods and Services Tax 
(GST) which is levied on fuel (and many other items). The tax per litre of fuel that is paid by 
persons varies considerably according to the region in which one buys the fuel (see Appendix 
                                                 
6 Australia Post, who has a monopoly in letter delivery and a very large footprint in parcel delivery is a wholly 
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B). Typically fuel in rural and remote areas costs considerably more than it does in urban 
areas (moreover, public transport in rural and remote areas is practically non-existent and vast 
distances must be travelled to do one’s shopping or take one’s children to school, hence 
relative consumption of fuel in rural and remote areas will typically be higher). Because the 
GST is levied on the purchase price, this means that persons living in some areas (particularly 
rural and regional areas) tend to pay a higher quantum of GST per litre of fuel, than do their 
fellow citizens in urban areas (it is important to note that this also varies on a state and 
territory basis). To further complicate matters and introduce more inequality, certain ‘off-
road’ industries (agriculture and mining which seem to have converted political power into 
rents) receive credits for fuel tax excise, and most businesses can claim back GST inputs. 
Notably the situation relating to GST on fuel also relates to most goods that attract the tax – 
due to transport costs, market size, and market competition, prices for the majority of goods 
in rural and remote areas (when they are available) are generally higher, which means the tax 
paid for exactly the same item is often higher in rural and regional areas. Another example 
can be found in the exemptions (for the family home) and discounts on capital gains tax (50% 
for individuals) which essentially mean that persons who earn income through capital gains 
on the family home or speculation receive disproportionate nett gains. Once again, because 
income and wealth are spatially distributed – as is, critically, capital gains on the house 
values – regional inequality in the impost of taxation, and granting of exemptions and 
concession on taxation, follows. Further inequitable rates of taxation also become clear when 
one considers business (particularly owner-operator small business)) relative to wage earners. 
In sum, the way taxation is levied in Australia results in spatial distribution of imposts (and 
taxation discounts and exemptions) so that the tax system ‘while nominally progressive, is 
much less progressive than it seems’ (Stiglitz, 2013, p. 343). 
It is also important to briefly reflect on the role of demographic spatial distributions on 
inequality. Population density, population growth, ethnic polarisation, socio-linguistic 
integration, age structure, education and welfare transfers are all spatially distributed and all 
have been identified as determinants of inequality (Rodriguez-Pose, 2013; Crenshaw, 2010; 
Breau, 2015). However, it is likely that there is a good deal of endogeneity between 
institutions and demographic spatial distributions; Rodriguez-Pose, 2013), as we have already 
alluded to. Moreover, there does not appear to be any empirical analysis of the determinants 
of inequality in an Australian context, and this is a significant gap in the literature that must 
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Options 
Putnam (2000, p. 413) in his seminal analysis of the collapse and revival of American 
community calls for ‘“social-capital impact statements” for new programs [that are] less 
bureaucratic and legalistic than environment impact statements have become, but equally 
effective at calling attention to unanticipated consequences’ as a mechanism to help reverse 
the trend of increasing disconnectedness from social structures. A similar case could be made 
for equality statements to be mandatory for major policy and institutional change – especially 
given the clear inequality in the Australian political system, evidence of less than satisfactory 
levels of inequality (which, in the case of wealth at least, appear to be at an alarming level), 
and the likelihood that extant inequalities in both will give rise to further exacerbation of 
inequalities of opportunity in the future. Requiring policy and institutional changes to be 
accompanied by an equality statement would focus attention on the problem and provide a 
level of transparency (and information) relating to decisions that is not currently available to 
citizens and the media. Moreover, explicit consideration of equality outcomes arising from 
policy and institutional change would provide an important counter-weight to the dominant 
form of political decision-making (business case analysis that will almost always be biased in 
favour of densely populated regions due to economies of size and density). The emphasis of 
such equality statements should be on equality of opportunity (because this is the most 
desirable end-state), although some attention must be given to equality of outcomes given the 
close links that it has to opportunity.  
 
Similarly an annual report on inequality in Australia, compiled by an appropriately resourced 
department (hopefully located in a region of inequality) tabled before Parliament on an 
annual basis would also serve to put the issue in the spotlight. Moreover, a requirement of 
this kind would hopefully result in more comprehensive and sophisticated metrics being 
collated and disseminated (for example, the ABS has advised that they do not keep metrics on 
the number of public servants and salaries of same, at a level lower than States/Territories). 
This would address the barriers that currently exist to conducting research, so that we can 
better understand the causes and potential solutions to higher than desired levels of 
inequality.  
 
The major sources of regional inequality, that we explicated on above, can also provide a 
good guide to some additional, more refined and targeted measures to address the problem 
(assuming we don’t wish to see rising, and indeed accelerated, inequality that would occur if 
we were to take a Tieboutian approach to the matter (do nothing and let people vote with 
their feet; Sellers et al., 2017)). 
 
Because a good deal of inequality arises as a result of inequality in political power (and 
moreover, because inequality is likely to have to be mitigated through a political means) it is 
important that priority be given to measures which might reduce political inequality (although 
we acknowledge that some of these measures would be difficult to implement). First, there is 
a clear case for publicly funded political campaigns to reduce the disproportionate power of 
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the public ultimately pay for political donations in any case, so publicly funding political 
campaigns simply makes the real cost more transparent (and can cap the cost – which can’t 
currently be achieved because we don’t know the rate of return that political donors are 
getting on their investment). Secondly, we can further regulate the activities of lobbyists, and 
movements of politicians (particularly Ministers) into and out of lobbyist ranks (and the 
corporations that they represent). Third, we can encourage political parties to be more aware 
of inequalities in political representation by requiring that the aforementioned equality 
statement also includes a statement on the representativeness of our legislatures. Fourth, there 
is a clear need for an anti-corruption commission to be established at a federal level, and for 
the powers of Commissions in all jurisdictions to be commensurate with the seriousness of 
the problems (particularly rent-seeking). Other reforms, such as the need to ensure regional 
equality in how electorate boundaries are designed, removing preferential voting, or even 
moving to an at large system of representation (which would eliminate regional political 
inequality entirely) face substantial obstacles and probably will never be implemented 
(although it is easy to argue that they should be). The point is that we have to start 
somewhere and making changes to the funding of campaigns and parties, the power of 
lobbyists and drawing attention to inequality in representation is something that can be done 
to try to mitigate some of the large inequalities that currently pervade the Australian system 
of government.  
 
With respect to inequality, in the ability to consume natural resources, it would seem 
important to ensure that the burden of constraints are transparent (hence the need for equality 
statements) and internalised by all regions (especially where some regions push for 
constraints which effects would otherwise not be felt by them). Typically, in economics, it is 
argued that a Coasian solution is the most efficient way of dealing with such problems – 
specifically, in the absence of transaction costs, the most efficient outcome will result if 
parties can bargain to solve the problem of externalities. Because government can enforce 
bargains and has sufficient scale to minimise transaction costs, government is in the best 
position to find efficient solutions to constraints that they may wish or need to impose on 
rural and remote communities (in particular) in pursuit of national objectives.  
 
Inequitable infrastructure is also a problem that will benefit from transparency arising from 
inequality reporting. Few residents of urban areas (and few politicians it seems) are aware of 
the fact that their rural peers live mostly with worse infrastructure than many developing 
nations provide for their citizens (although most people know that infrastructure in remote 
areas is deplorable). Merely getting the issue into the spotlight will be a great advance on the 
current state of affairs (people in Sydney might be concerned less with their billion dollar 
sport stadium upgrades if they knew that a few hundred kilometres away residents didn’t 
have town water, sealed roads or sewer services). The infrastructure inequality can’t be 
addressed quickly (if at all) simply because the backlog is so great, however, improving the 
system of grants made to local government and state governments – which are supposed to 
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allocation models and legislation7 – would be a significant step forward (see, for example 
Grant and Drew, 2017; Drew and Campbell, 2016; Drew and Dollery, 2015). It has also been 
suggested in the literature that decentralising government goods and service provision, 
combined with consolidation could also result in greater equality (see, for example Wei, 
2015), although this is unlikely to be a practical solution given Australia’s Constitution.  
 
Similarly, inequitable access to critical institutions would have a spotlight cast on it, were 
annual reporting of regional inequality implemented. In some instances, institutions could be 
relocated to provide for more regional equity in access – although this would be viable in 
only a limited number of cases. Investment in technologies and changes to policies to allow 
people greater access services through technology, would help in some other instances. 
However, in most cases inequality in access to institutions can probably not be directly 
mitigated, certainly not in the short term. If this is the case, then some form of transfer from 
those who benefit disproportionally through access to institutions to those who are unable to 
access institutions would be one way of dealing with the problem.  
 
Inequitable access to market goods can also be partially addressed by ensuring that all 
Australians have access to reliable telecommunications. However, it would also seem to be 
important to ensure that freight charges are subsidised or regulated to reduce the deleterious 
effect on spending capacity when market failure dictates access of this kind. It is also critical 
that where lower tiers of government are forced to operate businesses to address market 
failure at a loss, that this burden is specifically addressed through additional allocations in 
horizontal fiscal equalisation inter-governmental grant transfers (present allocations only 
consider ‘standard’ costs for providing ‘regular’ local government services). 
 
The annual statement of inequality should also draw attention to how taxation imposts, 
concessions and exemptions are spatially distributed. Beyond increasing the level of 
transparency – which would do much to dispel the myth of progressive taxation – 
governments can also make changes to taxation policy to address extant inequality. Thus 
changes could be made to existing exemptions, rates of taxation and concessions, although 
these will all have implications for the economy (some of which would not be tenable). Better 
still, transfers can be made to try to equalise effective rates of taxation, or a combination of 
both approaches could be made. Specific attention should be paid to how the GST is spatially 
distributed and also how the fuel taxes are levied (especially on communities that do not have 
access to public transport). The important thing, once again, is to expose inequality in the 
taxation system, mitigate same wherever possible, and ensure that future policy changes do 
not exacerbate extant inequality (which they are likely to do given the level of political 
inequality). 
 
In summary, ‘every law, every regulation, every institutional arrangement has distributive 
consequences’ (Stiglitz 2013, p. 66). The first step in dealing with regional inequality is to 
admit that profound regional inequality does exist, to collect the data, and get the issue onto 
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the political agenda (encapsulated in our plea for an annual regional inequality report). 
Although this is probably the easiest of the remedies that we have outlined, it is probably also 
the step at which the political class will balk at (because it implicitly acknowledges the role 
of politics in establishing or failing to mitigate extant inequality). However, if we are to avoid 
the deleterious outcomes associated with ever increasing levels of inequality – housing 
affordability crises, inefficient use of human resources, inefficient migration of capital and 
labour, political disillusionment, destructive rent-seeking and civil disobedience – then the 
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Appendix A. Regional Inequality 
Region Median Mean P80/P20 Gini Top 1% Top 10% 
Capital Region 44,110 54,054 4.84 0.457 6.7 30.2 
Central Coast 43,677 53,716 4.72 0.452 7.1 30.4 
Central West 43,834 54,112 5.04 0.465 6.7 30.5 
Coffs Harbour - Grafton 37,017 45,249 5.51 0.478 7.5 31.5 
Far West and Orana 43,739 51,765 4.82 0.468 6.6 29.7 
Hunter Valley exc Newcastle 45,556 58,769 5.25 0.473 7.6 31.5 
Illawarra 46,554 58,168 5.15 0.456 6.5 30.1 
Mid North Coast 35,997 44,288 6.18 0.489 7.4 32.0 
Murray 42,086 50,933 4.90 0.464 7.6 31.0 
New England and North West 40,516 48,321 5.41 0.495 8.0 31.9 
Newcastle and Lake Macquarie 47,165 58,968 5.01 0.462 7.5 31.3 
Richmond - Tweed 37,275 46,738 5.25 0.483 8.3 32.7 
Riverina 44,408 52,356 4.41 0.441 6.8 29.4 
Southern Highlands and Shoalhaven 38,935 50,939 5.40 0.493 9.2 33.9 
Sydney - Baulkham Hills and Hawkesbury 51,858 70,368 5.40 0.498 9.8 34.8 
Sydney - Blacktown 49,089 54,354 3.86 0.389 4.7 25.5 
Sydney - City and Inner South 52,586 72,791 5.24 0.508 12.5 37.0 
Sydney - Eastern Suburbs 59,999 99,522 5.61 0.581 17.4 45.7 
Sydney - Inner South West 43,307 53,375 4.50 0.450 7.2 30.5 
Sydney - Inner West 53,105 74,345 5.28 0.505 10.4 36.4 
Sydney - North Sydney and Hornsby 60,040 98,675 6.50 0.575 14.7 43.7 
Sydney - Northern Beaches 53,061 82,046 5.55 0.545 13.5 40.9 
Sydney - Outer South West 49,375 56,337 3.88 0.400 5.5 26.7 
Sydney - Outer West and Blue Mountains 49,470 56,820 4.11 0.410 5.8 27.1 
Sydney - Parramatta 44,029 52,343 4.57 0.434 5.7 28.5 
Sydney - Ryde 50,837 71,573 5.76 0.519 11.2 37.1 
Sydney - South West 45,075 51,510 3.95 0.404 5.4 26.9 
Sydney - Sutherland 52,884 69,158 4.79 0.475 9.3 33.5 
Ballarat 42,208 50,393 4.74 0.453 7.3 30.1 
Bendigo 42,223 50,450 4.89 0.453 6.9 30.1 
Geelong 44,113 55,327 4.90 0.466 8.0 31.9 
Hume 41,140 48,008 4.72 0.445 6.4 28.9 
Latrobe - Gippsland 40,298 51,015 5.28 0.475 6.5 31.7 
Melbourne - Inner 54,176 76,349 5.09 0.515 13.1 38.3 
Melbourne - Inner East 49,512 76,902 6.40 0.557 12.7 41.0 
Melbourne - Inner South 53,035 77,958 5.45 0.529 12.2 39.1 
Melbourne - North East 46,982 56,915 4.37 0.440 7.1 30.0 
Melbourne - North West 45,421 53,652 4.24 0.428 6.2 28.7 
Melbourne - Outer East 46,139 55,815 4.56 0.444 6.7 29.9 
Melbourne - South East 43,878 51,562 4.27 0.430 6.4 29.0 
Melbourne - West 46,964 53,989 4.07 0.411 5.5 27.4 
Mornington Peninsula 43,979 54,752 4.51 0.460 8.3 31.9 
North West 39,202 45,080 5.09 0.464 6.1 29.4 
Shepparton 40,160 46,874 4.73 0.453 6.7 29.4 
Warrnambool and South West 40,448 48,236 4.89 0.457 6.7 29.9 
Brisbane - East 49,737 61,800 4.40 0.449 7.4 31.2 
Brisbane - North 51,527 61,506 4.34 0.432 6.5 29.3 
Brisbane - South 47,443 59,862 4.95 0.467 8.0 32.1 
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Brisbane Inner City 55,557 82,994 5.48 0.533 12.3 39.8 
Cairns 42,343 51,684 4.59 0.451 6.7 30.5 
Darling Downs - Maranoa 39,272 46,708 5.56 0.504 7.0 31.6 
Central Queensland 52,917 69,029 5.48 0.476 6.4 30.9 
Gold Coast 42,720 54,948 4.50 0.471 8.8 33.1 
Ipswich 46,527 52,011 3.99 0.404 5.2 26.5 
Logan - Beaudesert 45,567 51,340 3.80 0.400 5.2 26.7 
Mackay - Isaac - Whitsunday 51,214 66,298 5.33 0.465 6.0 30.0 
Moreton Bay - North 42,981 50,763 4.55 0.440 6.2 29.4 
Moreton Bay - South 50,772 60,132 4.17 0.428 6.2 29.1 
Queensland - Outback 47,846 57,715 5.19 0.487 6.2 29.6 
Sunshine Coast 40,014 52,565 5.29 0.489 8.2 33.7 
Toowoomba 45,425 54,194 4.59 0.447 6.9 29.9 
Townsville 50,066 58,597 4.16 0.426 6.3 28.5 
Wide Bay 37,111 45,701 5.93 0.487 6.7 31.6 
Adelaide - Central and Hills 49,857 69,319 5.14 0.508 10.6 37.0 
Adelaide - North 45,038 49,772 3.80 0.393 5.0 25.8 
Adelaide - South 46,411 55,513 4.34 0.438 7.1 29.8 
Adelaide - West 46,216 54,567 4.23 0.427 6.5 28.9 
Barossa - Yorke - Mid North 42,397 52,049 4.95 0.467 7.0 31.2 
South Australia - Outback 48,334 59,080 4.95 0.447 5.3 28.7 
South Australia - South East 38,594 45,709 4.97 0.463 6.8 30.4 
Bunbury 46,024 61,680 5.60 0.485 7.0 32.0 
Mandurah 48,157 66,356 6.23 0.491 6.9 32.2 
Perth - Inner 61,685 104,690 7.07 0.582 13.4 44.1 
Perth - North East 52,743 63,991 4.41 0.438 6.3 29.6 
Perth - North West 53,500 68,776 4.77 0.462 7.5 32.0 
Perth - South East 51,806 64,772 4.72 0.454 7.1 31.2 
Perth - South West 55,180 72,751 5.16 0.477 8.1 32.9 
Western Australia - Wheat Belt 45,573 60,348 5.58 0.493 6.8 33.0 
Western Australia - Outback (North) 70,392 84,374 5.13 0.434 5.3 27.4 
Western Australia - Outback (South) 52,825 66,098 5.18 0.453 5.9 28.9 
Hobart 45,427 54,569 4.29 0.440 7.7 30.3 
Launceston and North East 41,811 50,065 4.56 0.451 7.3 30.4 
South East 36,927 44,407 5.32 0.474 7.5 31.2 
West and North West 41,816 49,216 4.78 0.440 6.2 28.7 
Darwin 60,572 71,185 3.74 0.412 6.5 28.9 
Northern Territory - Outback 51,797 59,232 4.21 0.411 5.4 26.9 
Australian Capital Territory 61,482 70,804 4.00 0.416 6.5 28.4 
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Appendix B 
At 1100 on the 18th of April, Fuel Check reported the following price for Unleaded 91 fuel at 
Caltex fuel stations: 
Table 6. Fuel Price Survey New South Wales, 2018. 
Suburb Price (cents) Suburb  Price (cents) 
Wentworth (median 
weekly household 
income $2,380; near 
Sydney) 
141.9 Cobar (median 
weekly household 
income $1,495; 




income $1,180; rural 
NSW area) 
149.9 Seven Hills (median 
weekly household 
income $1,551; near 
Sydney) 
139.9 
 
 
 
